An interview with Varuzhan Geghamyan, Ph.D.
On May 14, Turkey will hold its presidential and parliamentary elections. The closer the date is, the more intensified the discussions on this topic. Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 20 years in power have clearly proved and reaffirmed his Pan-Turkist aspirations and Armenian society is largely aware of his political vision. However, how do you assess Erdogan’s 20-year rule of Turkey? What are the key points of AKP’s ideology? What are the special features of Erdogan’s foreign policy, including the policy implemented in the South Caucasus?
Varuzhan Geghamyan, Ph.D.: Erdogan has been in power for more than 20 years. He came to power as a representative of the moderate Islamist movement, which started in the 1950s and finally succeeded in 2002 when Erdogan’s AKP (the Justice and Development Party) won seats in the parliament and managed to have a monopoly in power.
Starting from that period, there have been 3 main ages of Erdogan’s rule. The first period was more about reforms and democratic liberation, but these were not done for democracy itself. The democratic reforms were rather ways to weaken the position of the army and the former Kemalist bureaucracy so that Erdogan and his party could be freer and more independent in their actions. So, under the name of the reforms, he was actually vanishing the influence of his political rivals. Of course, these reforms were also done within the framework of Turkey’s prospective accession to the EU. Though it never happened still, it was a motive for these reforms. In this period, the majority of the Turkish population supported Erdogan not only in the Islamist-nationalist circles of the society but rather wider circles starting with national minorities up to religious minorities and representatives of the left and right.
The second period started around the 2010s when Erdogan managed to dispel his rivals from the game. In this period, he gradually became more authoritarian and started to implement the law in a way that was more supportive of the government rather than against it. Let’s say he put all the reforms back by making a new constitution and new legislation so that these changes served the benefit of Erdogan’s government.
The third period became more vivid at the end of the 2010s, especially in 2016 after the failed coup d’état. The presidential elections changed the country into a super presidential system, which gave Erdogan unchallengeable power. In this period, Turkey achieved a lot of success in the economy and in other spheres; however, we can say that there are still several problems, and these problems are becoming more and more obvious. As for the key points of the AKP’s ideology, it initially started its official rhetoric as democratic-liberal and moderate Islamist, but gradually it came back to its roots which are more connected to nationalism and Islamism.
Now under the sole rule of Erdogan, AKP is propagating a fervor of Muslim nationalism, the synthesis of nationalism and Islamism based on Ottoman cultural heritage. This is AKP’s main ideology which is predominant in Turkey, and the majority of the population is inclined to this ideology. This ideology also contributed to the development of Turkey’s foreign policy. Both the Ottoman heritage and innovativeness in foreign policy as well as the economic development and the state’s stability made it possible for Turkey to use different types of foreign policy tools in different regions like the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, etc. These tools include soft power, hard power, and smart power. So, the main feature of Erdogan’s foreign policy right now in the South Caucasus is the use of smart power, that is, the combination of hard and soft power with the sole aim of creating zones of Turkish influence in surrounding regions aimed at its ultimate goal, that is, bringing these lands, let’s not say, under the jurisdiction of Turkey but at least under the full control of Turkey.
What about Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the opposition’s choice for the presidential candidate? Who supports him, and what ideology does his party represent? What external and internal policy changes may happen in Turkey in case of his victory?
VG: First of all, I think the possibility of the opposition’s victory is very low. Kemal Kilicdaroglu is not the brightest figure in the opposition camp. He has a lot of personal ambitions, which, I think, are not supported by the opposition. Still, he is the main challenger of Erdogan, but I think he has a low chance of winning.
He has the support of all those who are against Erdogan. Hence, he is not a candidate-for but just a candidate who people are going to vote for just in order not to vote for Erdogan. This is very important to know; that’s why we can say that ideologically the group that supports Kilicdaroglu is a monolith.
Having the traditions of the Turkish state institutions, strategic thinking, etc., we can say that no matter who is in power or what kind of ideological differences parties have, Turkey’s foreign policy will be absolutely the same with just some tactical changes. So, I don’t think that we will witness foreign or internal policy changes in Turkey in case of the victory of the opposition, but again in case of some changes, they will be of tactical features, not strategic ones.
In terms of the geopolitical interests of the West and Russia, Turkey stands out as one of the key players in the Middle East. How do you assess Turkey’s relations with these parties at the moment? Will there be any fundamental changes in this context after the elections?
VG: The strategic interests of Turkey and the traditional state institutions are not connected to a politician or a party, but rather, it’s about the state and its national interests. So again, no fundamental changes are expected here either. As for Turkey’s role for the West and Russia, Turkey has a crucial geopolitical role in all processes in Eurasia and actually in the world. In some cases, it is very active, and Turkey plays not only just as an object but also as a subject of geopolitics. So, it is crucially important because of its geography both for the West and non-Western players, including Russia and China. That’s why all of these players are trying to have special relations with Turkey. Non-Western countries use the method of managing and leveraging within the framework of the relations with Turkey in order to have another tool in the context of the confrontation with the West. Hence, every country is trying to have this contact with Turkey; however, it doesn’t mean that these states have no problems or conflicts with Turkey. A good example is Turkey-Russia relations: there is competition for the spheres of influence, direct conflict in the case of Syria, but a partnership at the same time.
Rumors about Erdogan’s serious health problems have been widespread in recent weeks, which makes some circles think that the chances of Erdogan’s victory are falling. How do you assess Erdogan’s and his rival’s chances of winning?
VG: As I mentioned, I think that Erdogan and his party are going to win. On the contrary, Erdogan’s propaganda machine managed to use Erdogan’s health problems to raise his profile in society, manipulating the public by spreading the idea that Erdogan is so devoted to his nation that even health problems are not an obstacle to preventing him from serving Turkey. And I think that if nothing occurs out of the ordinary, like another earthquake or another kind of disaster, Erdogan will win. Even if votes show that he is losing, in that case, he will use all administrative resources and media resources to get that victory registered. However, I think there will be no need for that kind of measure.
It is important to note that the news about Erdogan’s poor health condition has aroused great enthusiasm in broad Armenian public circles, too. These circles hope that in the case of Kilicdaroglu’s victory, there may be major changes in the politics towards the South Caucasus. What impact may these elections have on Armenia? Can we expect serious changes in Turkish politics towards the South Caucasus in case Erdogan loses?
VG: Unfortunately, Armenian public opinion is much influenced by foreign agendas and foreign influence. The discussions about Erdogan’s health and the possible change of the government are another example of manipulation of Armenian public opinion. No matter who is in power, Turkey has crucial interests in Armenia and in the South Caucasus, so Turkey will continue to conduct the kind of policy that supports these interests.
Turkey will continue to try to spread its influence in this region. It has always tried, and now Turkey sees a historical chance for it as all its other rivals for the South Caucasus, Russia, and Iran, because of different factors and circumstances, are currently incapable of taking Turkey out of the region. That’s why Turkey sees it as a historical chance to establish its influence over this region. The South Caucasus is geographically of critical importance for Turkey as it is directly linked with other sub-regions like the North Caucasus, Northern Iran, Central Asia, etc., which also lie under Turkey’s interests. So, there is no hope that there will be a real change in the politics towards Armenia and the South Caucasus because it is not about a person, a party, or an ideology; it is only about the national and state interests of the Turkish republic. That’s why discussions about major changes are not serious.
Azerbaijan’s ex-president Heydar Aliyev’s “one nation, two states” concept is the best way to explain and make sense of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations which, in particular after the 44-Day War, have been more pronounced. The recent polls in Azerbaijan indicate that 90% of the participants support Erdogan. Besides, Erdogan is very popular with the Turkish diaspora. What are the main motives of Azeris and diaspora Turks to support Erdogan?
VG: The image of Erdogan is constantly being created as not just a leader of Turkey but rather the leader of the Turkish world and, actually, sometimes even as the leader of the Islamic world. So, naturally, he is a very popular person in Azerbaijan, especially with the 2020 War and its results because Erdogan is actually a key receiver of what Azerbaijan got during the war.
Erdogan, the one who participated in the military parade and said that “This is what we did, and this is also our war, not just Azerbaijan’s.” Of course, the state machine also is working in this direction to support this intervention of the two countries.
Besides, Azerbaijan is currently a part of Turkey’s geopolitical project in the South Caucasus. Erdogan is a hero for the Azeri population and Azeri Turks living in Azerbaijan, as he has helped them conquer swaths of Artsakh. So, it is natural that Erdogan has a lot of support. Of course, Erdogan and his circles are using the support of Azerbaijan, saying, “You see, we are the one that brings Pan-Turkism ideas into reality, and the last example was Karabakh, so if you are voting for us, you are voting for Pan-Turkish ambitions, and you are making our country bigger than it is right now. If Azerbaijan supports us, then we will be really one nation, two states.” Erdogan is really devoted to this idea. So, these are the main motives behind Azerbaijani’s support for Erdogan. The majority of diaspora Turks also support Erdogan because their background is from the rural areas of Turkey, which are supportive of Erdogan. Erdogan uses his official and non-official organizations, which work very intensively with the Turkish diaspora organizations and diaspora communities, and, if I am not mistaken, also taking the data of 2018, he got the majority of votes in the diaspora as well. So, I think this time we will have the same result.
At the moment, what are the main goals of the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem towards Armenia and Artsakh, and what developments are expected?
VG: For Turkey and Azerbaijan, the Armenian independent political factor in the region is a problem. The Armenian independent political factor is a problem, especially for Turkish ambitions in the region. Turkey is trying to become a regional superpower, and having established its influence on the South Caucasus, and it is becoming possible for Turkey to widen its influence on other different regions of high importance for Turkey. So, for Turkey, it is very important to weaken the Armenian political factor, that is, the Armenian state, which is the last unconquered part of this region. In case Turkey has its influence on Armenia, Turkey will weaken the positions of other geopolitical rivals in this region, like Russia and Iran. If there is no country that is not under Turkish influence, it is becoming more difficult for Russia and Iran to work with the region. So, in this way, Turkey is also solving a problem in the context of competition over the influence in this region. And definitely, Turkey will continue this strategy, especially right now when Turkey sees a great possibility to advance these ambitions because of Armenia’s weakness at the moment and the lack of resources of Russia and Iran to firm their position in the region and to be involved on the level that is required right now. That’s why Turkey does everything to put pressure on Armenia so that Armenia fulfills the preconditions, which are not just for the opening of the border or establishing relations; it is going far beyond. These preconditions are aimed at making Armenia weaker in order to get new concessions and be able to put in a new list of preconditions.
So, you mean that by conceding these preconditions, Armenia won’t get peace instead?
VG: There is no peace agenda on the Turkish and Azerbaijani sides. Actually, the understanding of peace is different for them. They say, “Until we don’t have full influence on the South Caucasus, there is no peace on our eastern borders and in the Turkic world. So, by saying peace, they mean having no challenge for their regional interests and ambitions. So, who can be a challenge in the South Caucasus for Turkey? Not Azerbaijan, definitely, Georgia is under Western influence, and it is geographically a little bit to the north, so it is not connected to the areas which are of crucial importance for Turkey; hence only Armenia remains. That’s why the whole pressure of Turkish foreign policy in the region is on Armenia right now.
Dr. Varuzhan Geghamyan is a Ph.D. and assistant professor at Yerevan State University. Dr. Geghamyan is a Turkologist specializing in Turkish-Armenian relations, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the greater Middle East and North Africa region.
Dr. Geghamyan earned his B.A. from the Department of Turkish Studies at Yerevan State University in 2011. In 2013, he submitted an M.A. thesis at the Department of Oriental Studies at St. Petersburg State University on “Ottoman Legacy in Modern Turkey.”
In 2017, he earned his Ph.D. degree in History with a dissertation on Socio-cultural dynamics in Turkey during the presidency of Ismet İnönü (1938-1950).
In 2019-2021, he was appointed as assistant to the President of the Republic of Armenia, Armen Sarkissian covering the Middle East and South Caucasus issues.
In the fall of 2018, he was appointed as the director of ARDI (Armenian Research & Development Institute) Foundation, a Yerevan-based think tank that covers regional sociopolitical transformations and provides consulting. Geghamyan is also one of the founders of the “Armenia Project,” a scientific-education, non-governmental organization founded in 2020 by a group of Armenian scientists and specialists. The mission of the organization is to develop the human capital of Armenia, thereby contributing to the formation of a national civil society in Armenia and the strengthening of Armenian statehood.
The interview was conducted by Zartonk correspondent Mariam Galstyan. Galstyan is a foreign affairs analyst and researcher on geopolitics and international relations with a degree in international relations from Yerevan State University.
